

Selection of the Next Somalia Parliament

The Citizens' View



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Executive Summary

- The overwhelming majority (79 percent) of those surveyed agree with the government's announcement that a one-person, one-vote election is not currently feasible in Somalia. Over 43 percent cite insecurity as the primary obstacle followed by 18 percent who blame resistance from political leaders as the key reason; another 18 percent indicate lack of electoral laws as the main hurdle.
- In the absence of a proper election, more than half (51 percent) favor either traditional elders or clan constituencies as the preferred selection alternative. Of those, just over 27 percent prefer that traditional elders select MPs as they did in 2012; while nearly a quarter prefer to have clan constituency assembly select MPs.
- Region or district-based selection is also popular among those surveyed. Some 41 percent prefer districts or regional administrations rather than a clan/elders-centric formula. Close to a quarter (22 percent) indicated they prefer district-based selection of representatives, while 19 percent of respondents want selection of MPs based on Somalia's regions.
- 64 percent of those surveyed stated they oppose the clan-based 4.5 power sharing formula. In contrast, 32 percent stated that they are happy with it, though a whopping 71 percent of those surveyed in Baidoa stated they favor the 4.5 formula.
- A clear majority (60 percent) oppose term extension for both the Federal Parliament and Government, reflecting widespread disapproval of the Government's performance. In fact, nearly 37 percent rate the Government's performance as poor while close to a quarter contends it has failed.
- 52 percent of the respondents blame corruption as a major cause of the Government's underperformance, while 22 percent cite incompetency.
- Dissatisfaction has also been extended to the international community with over 66 percent of respondents saying they disapprove of the external actors' influence in Somalia's affairs; 40 percent of those surveyed believe that the international community has done very little to help Somalia organize an election in 2016. More worryingly for the international community, 26 percent of respondents maintain that the international community failed Somalia. Still, a whopping 73 percent insist that the international community has an oversized influence in the direction of the country.

Background

In 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) drafted a comprehensive roadmap called Vision 2016 with the purpose of guiding the government until the end of its mandate. Vision 2016 has three key pillars: preparing the country for free and fair elections in 2016, finalizing the Provisional Constitution, and completing the federation process by establishing the remaining federal member states.

While all three objectives could be considered onerous and ambitious, organizing elections by 2016 seemed particularly prohibitive given the widespread insecurity, absence of electoral laws and woeful preparation on the part of the FGS. However, this impracticality became clear when the FGS announced officially on 28 July that there will not be a one-person one-vote election in 2016 “due to confluence of many factors.” For instance, the electoral process, was not agreed upon and key legislations including laws that govern political parties' remain in a draft.

In 2012, a group of 135 traditional elders were tasked with selecting 275 Members of Parliament from their respective constituencies and submitting them to a Technical Selection Committee (TSC) for vetting. Although the process was deeply flawed on many grounds it was nonetheless the best available option under the prevailing circumstances for three reasons. Firstly, the entire process was held in the capital Mogadishu – the first time a national government was selected inside the country since 1991. Secondly, the process was led by – and largely organized by – Somalis themselves. Thirdly, and most importantly, the outcome (275 MPs) was widely accepted as legitimate

and representative.

Notwithstanding its positive outcome, the process had fundamental problems. Corruption was rampant, as untold amounts of public and private money were spent to secure seats in the Federal Parliament. The process was entirely elite-driven, depriving the overwhelming majority of Somalis from participating in the political dispensation. The limited number of 135 traditional elders involved in creating the parliament meant that the selection process also lacked inclusivity and transparency.

As the mandate of the current Government approaches its final year, and given that a one-person, one-vote election will not be possible, politicians around the country have begun discussions on possible post-2016 selection plans. Recently, national and regional political leaders with the support of international partners launched the National Consultative Forum (NCF) on the electoral process in 2016. The NCF proposed four alternative options: a nationwide electoral college, a federal member state-level electoral college, a district-level electoral college and a clan-based electoral college.¹ The NCF concluded a series of consultations in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, Adado and Garowe. The outcome of the discussions is scheduled to be released by the end of this year or in early 2016.

HIPS initiated this research project, called “2016 Scenarios”, to contribute to the discourse on options for a peaceful and legitimate transition of power in 2016 using evidence-based data and sound analysis. The project aimed to present the voices of the Somali people on

¹ The Somali National Consultative Forum On The Electoral Process in 2016.
<http://www.villasomalia.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Facilitation-Guide.pdf>

2016 political dispensation and offer important information about emerging trends in Somali politics. The findings provide reliable, representative data on the views of residents in five major population centers, which contribute to the debate around the political process as major decisions about Somalia's future are being deliberated.

Methodology

Research was conducted in five geographically diverse and politically relevant cities across the country, namely: Garowe, Galkacyo (south), Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismaayo. Each city represents a federal member state. Our assumption was that views of the respondents in each city would, by and large, reflect the prevailing political views of the local elite who tend to shape the perceptions of the citizens.

The project employed a survey as the tool for collecting data. HIPS partnered with four universities: Puntland State University (PSU) in Garowe, Galkacyo University (GU) in South Galkacyo, the University of Southern Somalia (USS) in Baidoa and Kismaayo University in Kismaayo. Each university facilitated the research in its respective city. Each university also selected six graduates and/or students (three male and three female) who were trained to conduct the survey. Nineteen survey questions designed by HIPS in-house experts were administered to 1,287 individuals in the five locations. Furthermore, external Somali and non-Somali experts contributed their input on the questionnaire, the methods employed and data analyses.

The survey was conducted between 14 October and 17 November 2015. Of the 1,287 respondents, 360 were surveyed in Mogadishu, 227 in Garowe, 231 in South Galkayo, 237 in

Baidoa and 232 in Kismaayo. In consideration of including a more gender-balanced representation, 56 percent of respondents were male while 44 percent were female. The ages of the majority of the respondents (76 percent) were below 45; 41 percent were between 18-30 years, and 36 percent aged between 31-45 years. 18 percent were between the ages of 46-60 while the ages above 61 were only slightly over 5 percent. This is consistent with Somalia's overwhelming young population, according to recent data.²

In terms of education, 30 percent are secondary school graduates while roughly 27 percent hold university degrees. Approximately, a quarter never received any formal education, while 20 percent completed primary school. Of the people surveyed, about 30 percent are unemployed while 20 percent are students. The rest, 23 percent, work for NGOs, private and public sectors.

The sampling was based on the divisions or districts (waax, xaafad or degmo) of each city. Depending on the size of the city, each city was divided between four to eight divisions. Mogadishu was different from the other four cities given its bigger size. It has 17 districts, and each district has four divisions (waax). We were not able to conduct the survey in every division, but we randomly selected one division in each district for a total of 17 divisions. Each division had a random chance to be selected. However, because of security concerns and to ensure the safety of the enumerators; for example, districts in Mogadishu such as Huriwaa/Heliwaa and Dayniile districts we selected accessible and more secure divisions.

HIPS provided one day training for field researchers. The training consisted of research

² See "Population Estimate Survey" by the Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation – May 2015

methodologies, sampling techniques and how to use mobile phones to collect quantitative data. The enumerators were divided into two or three teams and were asked to interview an equal number of men and women, although the data shows there were slightly more male respondents than female. Each enumerator conducted 20 surveys per day over two days in Garowe, Galkacyo, Baidoa and Kismayo. In Mogadishu, enumerators spent three days in the field. To ensure the randomness of the survey, the enumerators surveyed one person in every 10 households in all cities except Galkayo (south) in which we interviewed one person in every five houses.

Limitations of the study

There were several limitations to our study:


- Insecurity was a challenge in all the cities we visited in general. For example, we were not able to randomly select divisions in two of Mogadishu's 17 districts. We were also unable to travel to Beledweyne – the sixth city in our itinerary - for security and other practical reasons.
- Only five cities were surveyed rather than the entire country. This leaves significant parts of the country uncovered. Thus, while the findings reveal the general trends and the perceptions of the citizens in the surveyed cities, the results cannot be generalized to all citizens of Somalia. However, the findings provide vital information for policymakers about Somali citizens in these major cities while revealing general prevailing attitudes toward 2016 options.
- Most Somali cities are dominated by one clan or related clans and it is highly likely that the survey did not capture views of representative number of minority communities sometimes referred as the 5thClan or the .5 clans, since these minority clans are often dispersed throughout the country.
- Smart phones were used for data collection, and although we trained the enumerators and gave them all the resources necessary for the survey, such sophisticated technology was new to some of them. As a result, some questions were partially answered (either the respondent refused to answer or the enumerator did not ask or record). This reduced the total number of respondents from our 1340 target to 1,287 interviewees.
- Certain questions were difficult for some of the respondents due to the lack of awareness about democratization and election issues; however, more than half (57 percent) of those surveyed indicated that they were either highly interested (29 percent) or interested (28 percent) in politics.
- We were not also able to conduct the survey in Somaliland for practical and resource reasons. Somaliland insists it is an independent republic, a claim that the rest of Somalia and the international community disagree with.

Findings and analyses

Impossibility of democratic elections

An absolute majority of those surveyed (79 percent) agree with the government that in


2016 a one-person, one-vote election is not possible in Somalia. Respondents recognized that given the poor preparation on the part of the FGS, a credible election is impossible for 2016. Only 21 percent said that such an election is possible.



Obstacles to 2016 elections

In its declaration that one-person, one-vote was impossible in 2016, the FGS cited “confluence of factors” without specifying them. Many assumed that insecurity topped the list of these factors, followed by lack of sufficient preparation on the part of the FGS. Although majority of large urban areas have been wrested away from the hands of al-Shabaab, the extremist group continues to strike at will. Since January 2015, most major hotels in Mogadishu were targets of suicide attacks, often killing so many people, including high profile individuals. Al-Shabaab has also ratcheted up its operations in Lower Shabelle and other regions. The deteriorated security condition was cited by respondents of the

survey as the primary inhibitor of one-person, one-vote in 2016. Nearly half of the respondents (43 percent) cite insecurity as the biggest obstacle to holding democratic elections. That was not surprising, but what was surprising is that over 18 percent of the respondents blame politicians for resisting elections. Since July when the FGS officially ruled out traditional elections, prominent politicians in the Federal Parliament have been advocating for an extension of their term by a few years. At the High Level Partnership Forum (HLPF) in Mogadishu on 29/30 July, it became evident that the majority of the 25 MPs attending were from the ‘pro extension’ camp.



Regional disparities on insecurity

The insecurity concerns of the five surveyed cities understandably vary as these major urban centers have had different security and governance trajectories. Residents of the most volatile cities over the years were the ones who cited highest security concerns. Insecurity perceptions in cities whose troubles are politically induced (such as Galkayo) and others whose security woes emanate from acts of terrorism (such as Baidoa) are however indistinguishable. The same and highest number (48 percent) of Galkayo and Baidoa residents said insecurity is the biggest challenge blocking elections; likewise, Mogadishu and Kismayo do not lag far behind, as 47 percent and 44 percent, respectively, cited security as the biggest obstacle to elections.

The sudden outbreak of violence in Galkayo between Puntland and Galmudug fighters in late November, which resulted in deaths, maiming and massive displacements illustrates that the Galkayo residents' worries on security


issues are not misplaced. It is not also surprising that Mogadishu residents consider insecurity as a major stumbling block to democratic elections. Although the Federal Government of Somalia has been in full control in the capital since 2011, assassinations and complex terrorist attacks resulting in huge casualties have been intermittent in Mogadishu during the last three years.

Insecurity however was not a major concern for the residents of Garowe, the capital of Puntland. A mere 27 percent of those surveyed said insecurity is a major impediment to direct elections. Puntland has a functioning administration since 1998 and its capital has been relatively safer than the other four cities. In Garowe the lack of electoral laws was seen as the biggest snag to elections (30 percent) and could be interpreted as elevated political awareness or susceptibility to official position of the regional government.

Alternative scenarios and preferred options


Despite the widespread disdain held towards Somalia's idiosyncratic clan system, traditional leadership seems to enjoy substantial legitimacy. The majority of those surveyed (51 percent) favor traditional elders or a clan constituency assembly (an enhanced version of the first) to be the basis of the selection of the next parliamentarians. Specifically, 27 percent suggest traditional elders should select

legislators, while 24 percent support clan constituency assembly selecting MPs –the second highest percentage. In contrast, close to one quarter (22 percent) prefer district-based representation, while a sizeable segment (19 percent) support selection based on regions. Little over 5 percent contend term extension for the incumbent parliament as their preferred route in establishing the next government.



Of those who want traditional elders to lead the selection, almost half (49 percent) believe that this option will produce a representative parliament highlighting that representation is at the heart of Somali politics and is the main reason behind the 4.5 power-sharing clan formula. Close to one quarter (22 percent) of those who believe clans should spearhead the selection, suggested that traditional elders

would produce legitimate parliamentarians. Fifteen percent indicate they support traditional elders because the process they used in the past is easier compared with other options, while 12 percent would entrust elders to elect their MPs, which they think is more efficient and less expensive.



Although the majority of respondents opt for traditional elders, or a variation of the clan formula, to be the best alternative options in

the event that an election is not feasible, the findings vary from city to city.

Regional Differences

In Baidoa, 67 percent of the respondents favor traditional elders or a clan constituency assembly. A significant number, (36 percent) prefer traditional elders to select MPs while 31 percent support clan constituency assemblies. Interestingly, only 8 percent favored regional administrations be given the authority to choose their representatives in the parliament, and yet another eight percent said district-level representation should be considered. Given that Baidoa and the people of Southwest compared to Garowe, Kismaayo and Mogadishu will have less representation and perhaps participation if selection were to be based on districts, the overwhelming support for traditional elders and clan constituencies was expected.

administrations select the 2016 MPs. The highest percentage (37 percent) favored district-based representatives. Another significant bloc (27 percent) said that regional administrations should be the basis of selection, indicating a clear majority of Garowe’s respondents prefer administrative-based methods rather than a clan quota. In addition, 20 percent of respondents said selection by traditional elders is the best method, while 13 percent supported a clan constituency assembly. Only 3 percent considered term extension as a viable strategy. There are a number of possible reasons as to why overwhelmingly the Garowe residents keenly prefer district-based selection as opposed to other options. For one, as explained below respondents in general and those in Garowe in particular indicated they loathe the 4.5 clan formula. They also hold unfavourable perception of the federal government and thus

In stark contrast to the outcome in Baidoa, the majority of the respondents in Garowe 64 percent prefer that districts or regional

the Garowe residents may not want the repetition of a flawed process (the 4.5 formula) and its outcome (elders' selected MPs) thus preferring an alternative selection process. Likewise, they may have been influenced by the views of the Puntland Government, which openly advocates departure from the 4.5 power sharing and calls for the adoption of a district based selection. Moreover, Puntland residents understand that district-based selection of MPs will likely produce substantially more representatives for their state in the Parliament.

In southern Galkayo (Galmudug), 61 percent of respondents state traditional elders or clan constituency assemblies should pick the next parliamentarians. The majority of the respondents (31 percent) said the use of traditional elders is the best alternative option, while 29 percent favored a clan constituency assembly. Being a divided city for so long, traditional elders were instrumental in the stability and reconciliation of the city so it is unsurprising that residents believe traditional elders and clan constituencies are the best alternative options. Conversely, 20 percent of south Galkayo residents support regional administrations, while 11 percent, the highest in all the cities surveyed, back term extension for the current parliament.

In Kismayo, slightly little over 56 percent of the respondents prefer the regional administration or districts to select the next parliamentarians. That is, 33 percent favor regional administrations, the highest percentage of those backing that option in all the cities surveyed. Moreover, 23 percent of respondents in Kismayo said district level representation would be the best way to select the next parliamentarians. This highlights either a deep mistrust of elders by the people of Kismayo or a


new found interest in a regional authority taking the lead in the post 2016 political dispensation. The fact that Kismayo as one the most diverse cities in the country with over dozen clans calling it home, it seems a regional character rather than district or clan identity is taking root. It is also possible that residents of Kismayo distrust potential dominant role of the federal government –with which the Jubbaland administration and citizens have tenuous relations at best. They may be worried that the government will manipulate the option adopted, and thus preferred a detached system or a process not led by Mogadishu and perhaps wanted it closer to home. Nearly one quarter of the respondents in Kismayo (22 percent) prefer traditional elders making the selection, while 17 percent expressed their preference for a clan constituent assembly. Only four percent considered term extension for the current parliament as a viable option.

In Mogadishu, 54 percent of those surveyed said either traditional elders (27 percent) or a clan constituency assembly (27 percent) should be the basis for selecting the next legislators. In contrast, 29 percent of those surveyed suggested district level-based representation, while 12 percent said regional administrations should lead the next selection process. The fact that more than half of those surveyed in the capital suggested traditional elders or clan constituencies are the most suited to select parliamentarians may have something to do with the familiarity that Mogadishu residents have with process when elders spearheaded the 2012 dispensation in the capital. However, close to 30 percent of respondent favored district-level representation, which indicates that residents are also happy with district-based elections as Mogadishu has 17 districts - the highest number of districts compared with other regions.

Extension

An extension of term for the FGS was not the preferred option for the majority of those surveyed in all cities. The question was asked twice. When asked the best alternative option if direct election is not feasible, only 5 percent preferred term extension of the current parliament. Likewise, when asked which government body (the parliament or the

government) deserves extension, a clear majority (60 percent) responded that neither the parliament nor the government deserve an extension. Only 14 percent welcomed an extension to the president and another 13 percent said that both should get an extension, while 12 percent favored giving an extension to the parliament.



In Garowe, 85 percent oppose an extension for both the government and the parliament. In Mogadishu, 72 percent oppose an extension, and in Baidoa and Kismayo 65 percent and 47 percent oppose extension respectively. Interestingly, in Galkayo only 26 percent oppose an extension, whereas 39 percent back an extension for the government.

The fact that only 47 percent of Kismayo's residents oppose extension compared to Garowe's massive 85 percent and that majority of Kismayo respondents prefer selection anchored on regions as opposed to Garowe's

preference on district based selection indicates that the two cities are not as joined at the hips as they are sometimes portrayed. The nuanced views in Kismayo, again, gives credence to the cosmopolitan nature of the city and the larger Jubaland region.

This study shows that extending the term for either the Parliament or the Government is not an option for most of the respondents. Many current MPs however seem to desire an extension, while the international community has repeatedly reiterated that an extension is


not acceptable. The findings of this study show that the sentiments of majority of respondent

clearly corresponds the position of the international community.

4.5 & selection of MPs

Asked if they are satisfied with the 4.5 clan power sharing formula in selecting the next federal parliamentarians, 64 percent of those surveyed stated they oppose it. In contrast, 32

percent stated that they are comfortable with it.



In Mogadishu, the highest percentage in all cities – a massive 81 percent – said they are against the famous clan power sharing system, whereas small minority – 17 percent – said that they are happy with it. Mogadishu resident’s dislike for the 4.5 might stem from the citizens’ proximity to and disappointment with the outcome of the clan system – the federal parliament and federal government. The fact that over 70 percent of Mogadishu’s resident oppose extension for the current parliament and likewise an equal number consider the government as underperforming might explain why they are discontented with the 4.5 clan formula. In other words, as the seat of the national government and the epicenter of where the 4.5 system is most practiced (where clan quota takes precedence over meritocracy),

Mogadishu residents are most knowledgeable about the power sharing system which could explain their strong views about its incompatibility with a modern, democratic government system.

In Garowe, 73 percent of those surveyed stated that they are unsatisfied with the 4.5 formula. In contrast, only 20 percent suggested they are content with the clan power sharing system.

In Kismayo, a clear majority (76 percent) stated they dislike the 4.5 system. Only 22 percent said that they are satisfied with 4.5.

In South Galkayo, 53 percent stated that they are unsatisfied with 4.5 clan power sharing system becoming the basis for selecting the

next parliamentarians, while only 4 percent stated that they are highly unsatisfied with the clan quota system. On the other hand, 38 percent suggested that they are either highly satisfied or satisfied with the 4.5 system.


Interestingly Baidoa was the only city that the overwhelming majority stated they support the

4.5 clan formula. A whopping 71 percent of those surveyed stated they are happy with the 4.5. More than half (51 percent) respondents are highly satisfied with it while 20 percent indicated they are satisfied with the power sharing formula. Only 26 percent of the respondents said they are unsatisfied with the 4.5 formula.

Government performance

Asked how they would rate the government performance, a significant majority of all respondents (62 percent) describe its performance as either poor or a failure. Of these who are discontented with the government, 37 percent rated it as poor, while one quarter (25 percent) said it is a failure. On

the other hand, 23 percent of those surveyed rated the government performance as good, while little over 11 percent labelled it excellent – making a total of about 34 percent of the people who are happy with the federal government’s performance.



In Garowe, 78 percent of those surveyed stated that the government’s performance is either poor or a failure. Of these, 35 percent rated it as poor and 43 percent as a failure. In contrast, just 15 percent thought the government’s work was good and only 4 percent rated it as excellent.

In Mogadishu, 73 percent of respondents rated the government’s performance as either poor

or a failure. While 44 percent thought it was poor, only 29 percent said the government had failed. On the other hand, 22 percent of respondents thought the government was performing well, while another 4 percent view it as an excellent.

It is revealing that the views of citizens in Mogadishu and Garowe are almost identical. One would have assumed the views of Garowe

respondents – a city that often had a strained relationship with the federal government and whose residents rarely experience any encounters with the federal government – would be different from that of Mogadishu – a city that is dominated by the federal government. Interestingly though, in both cities, only four percent consider the government’s performance as excellent while over seventy percent rate its performance as a substandard.

In Kismayo, 66 percent consider the government performance as either a failure or poor. Of these, 38 percent said it was poor, and 28 percent classed it as having failed. On the other hand, 26 percent thought the government had done good work, while just 5 percent rated it as an excellent performer; this means one-third of respondents were happy with the government’s work.

In Baidoa, a little over 62 percent of respondents describe the government performance as poor or a failure. Of those, 47 percent rated it as poor and 16 percent said it had failed. As for those who are happy, about a quarter (24 percent) thought the government was doing good, while 7 percent rated its performance as an excellent, putting those in the satisfied camp at 31 percent. It is telling how Baidoa’s underperformance views resemble that of Kismayo residents but the numbers become even more interesting where

the respondents answer what they think are the causes of such an underachievement status.


In contrast, in Galkayo, 70 percent suggested that the government performance is good or excellent. Of those who said the government is doing a good job, 28 percent rated it as good, while 42 percent, the highest percentage, rated it as excellent. Only 26 percent thought its performance were substandard; 16 percent saying it was poor and 10 percent stating it failed.

It is worth noting here, that South Galkayo is the only city whose residents said they are satisfied with the government’s performance and where respondents are also open to the idea of an extension of the government mandate. Galkayo is an important city in Galmudug – is a recently established region which the federal government supports and is led by a close associate of the federal president. Others, particularly Puntland, maintain Galmudug does not satisfy constitutional requirement for the creation of a regional state (which states a federal state must be made up of a two regions). One might assume thus that Galkayo’s love affair with the Federal Government is directly linked to the support that the nascent region gets from the federal leaders as well as the close political relationship between the presidents of Galmudug and Federal Government.

Causes of underperformance

When asked about the root causes of the federal government’s underperformance, 74 percent of respondents blame corruption and incompetency for the government’s dismal record. Of these, over 52 percent cite corruption as the main culprit, while 22 percent

consider incompetence as the source of the ineffectiveness. On the other hand, 15 percent of respondents view lack of will as the main reason for the inability to deliver. Only 11 percent said lack of capacity is holding the government back.



The highest percentage (64 percent) of Mogadishu’s residents cited corruption as the primary cause of government’s underperformance. 14 percent of the respondents see lack of capacity as the main cause of the failure, whereas 13 percent pointed out incompetence as the reason of the poor performance; just 9 percent cited lack of will.

In Garowe, 53 percent blamed corruption as the cause of the underperformance, while little over 22 percent cited incompetence as the main driver of the underachievement; On the other hand, 15 percent said lack of will is the chief culprit and 9 percent of respondents suggested lack of capacity as the source of the government’s underperformance.

In Baidoa, about 49 percent of the respondents said corruption is the main driver of the government’s failure to deliver, whereas 20 percent thought incompetence was the main cause; 18 percent blamed lack of capacity for government’s inability to deliver. Only 12 percent cited lack of will as the biggest problem.

In Galkayo, of the quarter who said the government is under performing, 45 percent suggested corruption as the main cause of the problem while 36 percent saw incompetence as the chief cause; 10 percent suggested lack of capacity as the source of the performance challenges whereas another 10 percent blamed lack of will on the part of the government.

In Kismayo, 44 percent said corruption is the main cause of government’s failure while 22 percent suggested incompetence; 22 percent however pointed the finger at a lack of will; and 13 percent thought lack of capacity being the reason for the failure.

Of those who said government is underperforming, above 70 percent of each city’s respondents cited corruption, incompetence and lack of will as the top three reasons of the underperformance. When survey participants say the government is corrupt, or is incompetent or lacks the will to do what is right or needed (election in this case) respondents are placing the responsibilities of the failure at the


government's feet whereas when they cite 'lack of capacity' as the reason why the government is not making progress they are insinuating

absence of financial or human resource are contributing to the failure.

Role of the international community

The international community's hands-on role in Somalia has been significant and pronounced in the past quarter of a century. The UN and the western donor countries were instrumental in ending 12 years of transitional governments in Somalia; they paid for the writing of a new Somalia constitution. The international community prop up the current federal government and also bankroll AU peacekeepers battling Al Shabaab; donors even provide financial backing for the ongoing efforts of the national consultative forums. However, the view of the survey respondents towards the international community is not as positive as the donors might like.

Participants in the study were asked whether the international community has done what was needed in order for an election to take place in Somalia in 2016. A significant majority (67 percent) said the international community had failed or had done little to help Somalia usher in democratic elections. A substantial segment (40 percent of those surveyed) said that the international community has done very little to help Somalia while 26 percent said that the international community had altogether failed Somalia. On the other hand, 28 percent suggested that the international community has done all that it could do to help Somalia stage an effective and transparent federal election.



Asked about the influence of the international community on the electoral process that Somalia might end up with, an overwhelming majority of those surveyed (73 percent)

suggested it is role will be significant or very significant. Close to half (48 percent) thought that external actors had very significant influence. One in four respondents (25 percent)

thought the international community's influence is significant.

Although perception of the international community's role in heralding democratic elections in Somalia is low, the respondents

Conclusion

This study reveals that surveyed citizens in five major urban centres have strong views on post 2016 selection scenarios and the direction the country should take. Their views should be taken into account if participatory democracy is to take root in the nation. The research also shows that there is a widespread rejection of the 4.5 clan formula, with the exception of the Southwest region. A majority of those surveyed also stated that they are dissatisfied with the federal government's performance. An overwhelming majority of those who participated the study made clear that they are against a term extension for the current parliament. Most of the respondents also emphasized their misgivings about the international community's pervasive influence in Somalia.

believe that it will have a significant influence in the process and selection model Somalia adopts in 2016. Only 19 percent said that the influence of the international community is insignificant.

More tellingly, 72 percent of those surveyed indicated they would prefer a selection process other than the traditional elders selecting MPs. This suggests that Somalis want a more credible and better selection process than the previous elders dominated method. Notwithstanding the emphasis made that a more legitimate process is needed, still of the four possible options for selecting parliamentarians, elders and clan constituency scenarios are more preferred options for the majority of respondents than district based and region dominated selections. This, therefore further suggests, that the unelected regional politicians' insistence to replace the clan structures with a politician-dominated selection agenda is not grounded on wishes of the citizens and is more of a power grab than advancing of the democratic process.

Policy considerations

1) The Somali people were promised one-person, one vote, a promise that was not realistic when it was made then and not possible to deliver now. Therefore, since an election is not achievable within the given timeframe, Somali citizens should be genuinely consulted about the next political dispensation. This survey gauged what Somali citizens think and what they want with regards to the post-2016 selection scenarios. A Somali proverb states, *Meyd iyo Martibaa la maamulaa*, which translates that only a corpse and guests are better suited to be managed without seeking their input. Somalis are neither dead nor guests in their own country, and their voices should be heard.

2) The next selection process should not become a clique-hijacked or an elite-driven process where federal politicians/groups and regional leaders cut deals. It should be genuinely inclusive and based on what is good for Somalia and Somalis for now and in the future.

3) The post-2016 electoral process should be designed in a way that leads Somalia towards a legitimate and democratic election in 2020. This must be the overarching objective otherwise Somalia will have permanent transitional governments and non-elected politicians, which will perpetuate the dysfunctional status quo.

4) The role of the legitimate traditional elders should not be undermined. The elders are significant pillars in Puntland and Somaliland's stability. They also have been source of stability at the national scene – whenever they were asked to serve. It was the elders who created successive (albeit not the best) parliaments for

Somalia in 2000 (Arta Djibouti), in 2004 (Mbaghati, Kenya), in 2009 (Djibouti) and in 2012 (Mogadishu). The clan leaders should not be excluded for political expediency. Of course, citizens surveyed have indicated they do not want a repeat of the 2012 process. However, in the absence of one-person, one-vote – the survey shows citizens consider that clan structures – elders and constituent assembly – are better suited to produce a more credible, representative and legitimate parliament over other possible scenarios.

In order to accommodate the needs of a significant portion of the citizenry who advocate for administrative based processes – be it districts or region based selection process – regional parliaments may be mandated – where possible – to play a role in the selection, on purely meritocracy basis, of the deputies for the 54-member Upper House – which the Provisional Constitution mandates and which was supposed to come from the federal member states. The Upper House or the Senate is needed for the election of the national president and the creation of the Constitutional Court – among many other vital national commissions and institutions.

5) The scourge of corruption is one of the biggest problems holding back Somalia as well as destroying the democratic process and the emergence of accountable leaders. That corruption includes vote-buying, corrupting elders and the creation of a blatant and pervasive political culture where money is the final arbiter of who gets into power. The post-2016 selection process should be designed in a way that halts and reverses this destructive trend. Parliament should pass, or dust off, laws that penalize sleaze. Transparent processes

with robust verification mechanisms should be created. Both civil society and the international community should play an active role in fighting such a political vice.

6) The emergence of political parties should be encouraged. The post-2016 institutions should give a meaningful role to political platforms, political programs and political ideas rather than the barren 4.5 clan representation. What happens in 2016 should lead to proper elections in 2020. Nurturing and giving a space to the nascent and emerging political parties should therefore be part of the

democratization imperative.

7) The international community has immense influence and input into present day Somali politics – a fact that the citizens we surveyed are aware of and are not impressed with. The international community should use whatever credibility and leverage it has to help Somalia usher in a credible and fair selection process and it should help halt the devastating effect that corruption and vote buying has on the country's nascent institutions.

